ON THE UNEASY RELATION BETWEEN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEMOCRACY
Carol C. Gould
The question we are asked to address is as follows: "Is international law
a threat to democracy?" As a political philosopher, my inclination is to suggest
that the answer requires clarifying at the outset the sense in which we are using
each of the main terms here. Thus, whether international law is or is not a
threat to democracy depends on which aspect of international law is our focus
and whether we are restricting our discussion to international law as it is or as
it might come to be further developed. In like fashion, our judgment on this
issue would vary with how "thin" a notion of democracy we are working with
and in particular, whether we limit our conception to the very partial
democracies characteristic of many "advanced liberal democracies." It
addition, the answer will depend in part on whether we properly distinguish
democracy from sovereignty and whether we are willing to extend our
conception to include transnational democratic arrangements.
International law has been roundly criticized by certain United States
theorists who seek to defend older ideas of state sovereignty, for example,
Jeremy Rabkin.1 Such critiques from the standpoint of sovereignty are
somewhat surprising, however, since international law in its modern forms is
rooted in relations among sovereign nation-states, whether defined by treaties
or by customary rules and practices. But the critics' objection can be seen as
more consistent when we appreciate that their aim is often not to defend
sovereignty per se but rather American sovereignty. Thus when they criticize
the International Criminal Court, for example, or even the various Human
Rights conventions, what such critics are most concerned with is the impact of
these institutions or agreements on the United States. To the degree that this
is the case, they have been characterized as defending what has been called
American exceptionalism to international law.
Alternatively, a claim to the illegitimacy of such law may arise from a
more universalistic and less narrow perspective that locates the problem not
with sovereignty but in a deficit in regard to democracy itself. This standpoint
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(perhaps involved in the recent French rejection of the European Union
Constitution) objects to the idea that political and legal elites should be able to
draft international laws and agreements that are not fully based on national
democratic decision making. Here, what comes into play is the recognition that
the institutions of global governance, whether the EU or NAFTA or even more
fully multilateral organizations like the WTO or the UN itself, do not have a
sufficient grounding in the democratic decisions of the people affected by their
laws, regulations, or policies. A complication here is introduced by the fact that
the people affected are often situated at some distance and may live in other
nation-states. So this version of the critique may emphasize either the lack of
accountability of these transnational institutions to national democratic decision
making or more fundamentally may stress that the decisions are taken by elites,
unaccountable to the people affected, wherever these people may be located.
Yet another avenue of criticism of international law turns the first
objection on its head and argues that international law may be illegitimate in
certain aspects precisely insofar as it is still based on sovereign nation-states.
This critique has several dimensions: It may point to the fact that such states are
most often not very democratic inasmuch as they have reduced democracy to
periodic elections, themselves sometimes usurped by the power of big money;
or else it may be observed that states include ones that are not democratic at all,
even in this thin, liberal mode. On these grounds it could be concluded that
international law is illegitimate to the degree that it is made by, or seeks to
protect, sovereign nondemocratic states of those sorts. Even apart from this
critique, it is widely agreed that nation-states are no longer as exclusively
dominant as before (including in international law) because of the importance
of cross-border and transnational relations established through globalization,
whether economic, technological, social, cultural, and political. The salience
of these new transnational relationships also contributes to the lack of
effectiveness of some aspects of international law itself. In this sense, it can be
argued that to the degree that international law is tied to state sovereignty, it can
hamper the development of new forms of transnational democracy. Further,
because of its source in nation-states and their interests, international law
currently lacks the means of dealing with crucial issues of global justice that are
posed by the strengthening of economic globalization, led by transnational
corporations, with their important economic and ecological effects.
In order to analyze these complex issues here, it may be helpful to begin
by briefly comparing two different cases (or sorts of cases) of international law.
The first set consists of various decisions under NAFTA regarding toxic waste
dumping. In one, a NAFTA tribunal ruled that the Canadian government owed
up to fifty million dollars in compensation to an Ohio toxic waste disposal
company (S. D. Myers, Inc.). Since Canada bans the export of PCBs, this
company was able to claim that it was denied the right to import hazardous PCB
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waste from Canada. Canada argued that to permit such export would require
it to violate the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, a UN treaty to which it is a Party. 2 A
related case was the NAFrA dispute tribunal's finding (arrived at in secret) in
favor of Metalclad Corp., which had sought compensation for not being able to
open a hazardous waste landfill in Mexico near the border because of protests
from the surrounding community members. 3 Although both of these cases raise
issues of the overriding of state sovereignty, they speak more strongly to the
capacity of such rulings to overcome regulations that protect health and other
human security factors, with consequences for people's human rights. They
also demonstrate a lack of democratic accountability of these tribunals to the
people affected by their decisions, not only within a given nation-state but
across borders. Instead, the multilateral organizations involved seem to
function here almost exclusively to advance corporate interests, apparently at
the expense of human rights.
We can contrast with these cases the important developments in
international law designed to hold wrongdoers accountable for crimes against
humanity and for war crimes, in the UN tribunals and now the International
Criminal Court. Of great significance too are other efforts to strengthen and
give teeth to protection of human rights across borders and to provide appeals
for the protection of these rights even against the decisions of nation-states in
regard to their own citizens.4 This is most evident in the European
jurisprudence regarding human rights and the two European Courts that serve
to protect these rights regionally. A weaker but not insignificant version of this
is also found in the Interamerican Court of Human Rights. Nonetheless, this
jurisprudence has not gone very far in interpreting the economic and social
rights, or in assuring not only the protection of human rights but also enhancing
people's opportunities to fulfill them. Of course, it is clear that much of this
effort would belong more within the domain of democratic decision-making by
people and legislatures. So, it remains to consider how this sort of democratic
provision of the opportunities for rights fulfillment can be made more effective
and how to conceive the relation of democratic participation to international
law more generally.
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While I can only begin to address the difficult conceptual and practical
issues involved here, I will make a few suggestions, starting from the account
I give of the relation of human rights and democracy in my recent book
Globalizing Democracy andHuman Rights. Since human rights specify the
basic conditions that everyone needs for their freedom and dignity, we can say
that although these rights are subject to somewhat varying cultural and social
interpretations, they ought to have priority within international law. In addition,
they can rightly constrain democratic decisions that violate them in the same
way that a national constitution, and especially a bill of rights, can serve to
protect important rights of minorities if majorities seek to violate them. 6 For
human rights to be effective in this way, they need further institutionalization
or even constitutionalization at regional levels, and regional courts of human
rights would appear as a positive development in this perspective. One can
speculate that if the EU constitution had remained with a specification and
further institutionalization of rights, it could have gained wider assent.
Needless to say, care must be taken not to overly narrow the scope of national
or local democratic decision through such rights.
But the relation between democracy and human rights is more complex
than this. Thus I argue that impact on the basic human rights of people at a
distance serves as a criterion for giving these people some input into the
decisions of international organizations.7 Without proposing that everyone
ought to have input into every decision that affects them, which would be
impossible, we can say that wider transnational participation and representation
are required given the intensive interrelations and significant human rights
impacts that follow on contemporary forms of globalization. Clearly, this
implies opening up the decisions of organizations like the WTO not only by
making them more transparent, but by enabling participation in them (including
in the epistemic communities so important to their functioning) on the part of
representatives of people affected by their policies. In the absence of new
modes of such participation and representation, NGOs may serve in the near
term to represent those seriously affected. But the NGOs would themselves
have to be sure to operate by principles of democratic accountability to their
members, which some, though not all already do. I also propose that the
transnational organizations (including global corporations as well) should be
required to prepare what I would call "human rights assessments," to consider
and respond to the impact of their rules, policies, and activities on the
opportunities for human rights fulfillment by those affected.
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Beyond this, we can say more generally that international law should
regard itself as the handmaiden of democracy, where by democracy we mean
democratic associations at all levels. This suggests that rules and laws need to
be structured with the principle of subsidiary in view, so that decision-making
can occur at the lowest level relevant, and should also show deference to the
diversity of democratic forms of participation and representation at all levels.
It is likewise important to leave room for some diversity in the cultural and
social interpretations of norms.8 Inclusion of a wider sphere of interpreters,
somewhat similar to what is happening in the sphere of human rights law,
would be important, as would be opportunities for public deliberation about
these norms and laws.
Other forms of transnational representation are also imaginable beyond
simply opening up existing forums to NGOs. There are proposals like those of
Philippe Schmitter for reciprocal representation in legislatures or Michael
Saward's promotion of cross-border referenda or forums.9 Preferably within
the context of regional human rights protections, closer connections between
national legislatures would be possible (including joint legislation by
subcommittees within them), as would the development of democratic decisionmaking within new cross-border communities. More generally, the introduction
of such democratic modes of decision making in transnational communities,
whether economic, ecological, or simply communicative, as through the
Internet, should be encouraged and facilitated by law (but only if regulations
and laws are in fact necessary).
Proposals for a more representative global democratic assembly (Held'1 )
or a global parliament (Falk and Strauss') are useful additions to a system
currently limited to representatives of states. But these very large scale
institutions would have a hard time being fully representative on my view, and
would need to avoid replicating the lack of real democratic participation so
evident at national levels. They cannot replace the work of expanding
democratic modes within the variety of associations at lower levels,
increasingly of a transnational sort, and including not only political associations
but economic and social ones as well. 12 Such an expansion of democracy (in
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both procedural and more substantive senses) in this wide range of institutional
contexts provides the greatest hope, in my view, for eventually instituting what
has been called international law from below.

